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Abstract   Under the rubric of sustainable fisheries, nations are mandated to
rebuild overfished stocks. Although rebuilding strategies are almost universally
directed by the available biological information, approaches vary depending on
fishery laws, management objectives, and technical guidelines. For example, re-
building schedules in the United States are primarily designed to achieve rapid
rebuilding of biomass and spawning stocks consistent with the biological char-
acteristics of the resource. In contrast, New Zealand has greater flexibility in
rebuilding stocks in order to consider economic, social, and cultural needs. In
this paper we investigate potential economic costs to the fishery that result by
limiting the US manager’s flexibility in choosing a recovery trajectory. Using
numerical models for moderate- and long-lived stocks, the analysis reveals that
depending on productivity of the stock and the discount rate, extending the re-
building timeframe can substantially increase annual harvests and economic
benefits. The results underscore the importance of economic analysis in crafting
flexible rebuilding schedules that account for the unique characteristics of the
fisheries, including economic and social needs.
Key words   Fisheries economics, fisheries management, K-selective species,
rebuilding.
JEL Classification Codes   Q22, C61.
Introduction
Under the rubric of sustainable fisheries, fishery managers are required to rebuild
overfished stocks. Although rebuilding strategies are almost universally directed by
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the available biological information, approaches vary depending on national laws
and technical guidelines. As one comparative example, the United States and New
Zealand are mandated by their respective fisheries laws—the 1996 reauthorization
of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA)
and the 1996 New Zealand Fisheries Act—to rebuild “overfished” stocks (NOAA
Fisheries 1996; New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries 2002). The MSFMCA requires
the preparation of a recovery plan for overfished stocks so that stock levels are able
to support maximum sustainable yield (MSY) levels within 10 years if biologically
feasible, or 10 years plus one generation if not.1 In contrast, the New Zealand Fish-
eries Act does not require a specific time limit for rebuilding even though stocks are
also required to reach levels that can produce MSY. The New Zealand Fisheries Act
does, however, require the rebuilding plan to consider relevant social, cultural, and
economic factors. Thus, New Zealand fishery managers have considerably more le-
gal scope to set an optimal recovery trajectory for a depleted or overfished stock
compared to their counterparts in the US who are restricted to biologically deter-
mined schedules.
Fishery managers in the US and New Zealand have been slow to adopt standard
resource economic approaches to assist with stock management and the design of re-
covery strategies. The reasons for this may include a lack of familiarity with
appropriate methodologies, inadequate economic data, perceptions that economic
models are too complex to be a routine part of decision making, and poorly defined
economic or social objectives. At best, fisheries managers are ignoring important
decision support tools, and, at worst, managers are neglecting their responsibilities
to make decisions with the best available information.
This paper aims to demonstrate that resource economics provides practical tools
and insights in exploring stock-recovery issues and developing harvest strategies
that improve social welfare. To support this assertion, a stylized bioeconomic model
is developed that is consistent with key aspects of legislated stock rebuilding man-
dates, such as those found in the US and New Zealand. Given the intertemporal
nature of sustainable resource use, and the frequent need to evaluate relatively long-
lived stocks, a dynamic programming bioeconomic model is constructed to estimate
optimal harvesting and rebuilding strategies for both a “moderate-lived” and a
“long-lived” stock. The model is used to compare the effects of rebuilding on differ-
ent “assemblages,” as recently recommended by NOAA Fisheries (2005), and is
consistent with the recommendation by King and McFarlane (2003) to group species
by “strategist” groups for management. The model is also used to simulate the ef-
fects of alternative regulatory actions designed to capture key differences in
legislative mandates for rebuilding between the two nations. Such differences in-
clude assumptions regarding the rights of future generations, the rebuilding
timeframe, and supplemental output controls. Results are intended to provide insight
into economic outcomes associated with alternative approaches to rebuilding de-
pleted commercial fish stocks.
1 The exact intent of the U.S. Congress in mandating rebuilding of overfished stocks is unclear, as are
the implementing guidelines developed by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). In particular,
there is confusion about conflicting objectives if stocks must be rebuilt “in the shortest time period pos-
sible” while considering the “needs of fishing communities.” The intent is even more uncertain for
stocks that cannot be rebuilt within 10 years, which can result in perverse rebuilding strategies, such as
increased harvests for stocks at relatively low levels (e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council vs.
NMFS (2005) provides an interpretation to rebuilding moderate- and long-lived stocks of West Coast
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Bioeconomic Model
Bioeconomic models are generally used to determine the efficient use of resources
over time by simultaneously considering biological and economic factors. In fisher-
ies, empirical bioeconomic models have been used to evaluate resource management
problems and develop policy options (e.g., setting annual harvest quotas or alloca-
tions) that could better satisfy management objectives (Gilbert 1988; Kellogg,
Easley, and Johnson 1988; Önal et al. 1991; Milliman et al. 1992; Sylvia and
Enriquez 1994; Sandberg, Bogstad, and Røttingen 1997; Larkin and Sylvia 2004).
For a depleted stock, a dynamic bioeconomic analysis can reveal economic and bio-
logical tradeoffs associated with different rebuilding timeframes and can provide
rebuilding schedules that best achieve management objectives.
The biological and economic variables in this paper are defined across time (t),
which represents years. The stock is assumed to consist of multiple cohorts that are
distinguished by age in years (a). Greek letters are used to represent exogenous pa-
rameters. Uppercase letters are used to represent the endogenous variables. The
model is structured to determine the time path of harvest that maximizes the social
welfare generated by the fishery subject to the biological dynamics of the stock,
economic conditions, and rebuilding requirements. Social welfare is represented as
the discounted dollar value of net economic benefits derived from the commercial
use of the resource.
The biological component of the model is based on conventional, age-structured
population dynamics (Ricker 1975). The number of fish in each cohort that is vul-
nerable to fishing effort is assumed exogenous in the first year (i.e., Nt=1,a known).
This initial stock size was constructed assuming an initial recruitment level (i.e.,
Nt=1,a=1 known), instantaneous natural mortality rate (ω), and average life span with
the following equation:
NN ta ta =+ = = ⋅− 11 1 ,, exp( ). ω (1)
Equation (1) generates an initial stock that declines in numbers by age; that is, the
youngest (oldest) cohort is the most (least) abundant. To account for fish that would
otherwise disappear from the model after reaching the oldest cohort (A), an accumu-
lator equation was used to augment the initial size of A (i.e., create a “plus-group”
terminal age class; Haddon 2001).
Growth of the individual fish is assumed to follow the von Bertalanffy specifi-
cation for length-at-age (Haddon 2001):
LL a a = ⋅− − ⋅− [] {} ∞ 1 exp ( ) , μλ (2)
where L∞ is the average length at maximum age, μ is the growth rate coefficient, and
λ is age at which the species has zero length (i.e., it is a hypothetical age that affects
the position and steepness of the growth curve). Then, using the common power re-
lationship, length is used to determine weight-at-age (Haddon 2001):
WL aa = ⋅ γ φ, (3)
using a constant for scaling (γ) and the allometric growth parameter (φ).
Using the initial stock size and growth equations, the initial biomass is calcu-
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BN W ta ta a == = ⋅ 11 ,, . (4)
The biomass is the total weight of all fish in the stock. This measure is contrasted
with the spawning biomass (SB) that only contains mature cohorts (a ≥ am). Spawn-
ing biomass can be measured in numbers or weight:
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Recruitment is defined as the number of fish of the youngest age added to the
stock in each year (Rt):
NR ta t , . = = 1 (6)
The model also identifies the youngest harvestable age (age at full selectivity). This
is important for moderate- and long-lived stocks since length of time to maturity and
reproduction can be significant relative to the rebuilding mandates and planning ho-
rizons of managers.
Employing the common Beverton-Holt specification ensures that recruitment is















The parameter α is important in determining both the productivity of the stock and
the stock size at which productivity is maximized (Campbell, Hand, and Smith
1993). β is the size of the spawning stock that produces half the maximum recruit-
ment. The Beverton-Holt curve rises steadily from zero but the slope becomes less
steep, and as the spawning stock grows proportionally large, the recruitment ap-
proaches the upper limit of α·β. For our stylized model we assume values for α that
represent growth for 20- and 70-cohort stocks, and then use equation (7) with the
assumed initial recruitment and spawning biomass to solve for β. This approach
generates the pristine stock size; that is, the stable stock level in the absence of fish-
ing that will be used to generate an overfished stock size to begin rebuilding
scenarios.
To move the stock into subsequent years, the model must advance the age of
each cohort:
NN Z t a ta ta ++= ⋅− 11 ,, , exp( ). (8)
The stock size in year t + 1 is determined by the stock size in year t and the total
instantaneous mortality rate in year t(Zt,a), which varies by cohort. The total instan-
taneous mortality rate is composed of natural mortality and fishing mortality (F):
ZF ta ta ,, . =+ ω (9)
For simplicity the natural mortality rate is assumed equal across cohorts.
The number of fish harvested is determined by multiplying the proportion ofOptimal Rebuilding under Alternative Plans 399
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The total annual harvest, in weight, which is referred to as the total allowable catch
(TAC), is determined by multiplying the catch in numbers by the weight-at-age:
TAC H W tt a a
a
= ⋅ ∑ () . , (11)
The net present value is calculated as the sum of annual net benefits (i.e., gross
revenues less variable and fixed costs) discounted at δ:
NPV TAC P TAC VC SB W
t
T t










χ () ( ) , _ (12)
where P is an endogenous price specification that can account for the product mar-
ket effects of rebuilding:
P TAC TAC tt t () . = −⋅ θτ (13)
Conversely, the additional costs fishers must face to search for fish when stock lev-
els are low can be incorporated by specifying that variable costs are inversely
related to the spawning biomass:
VC SB W SB W tt t () , __ = −⋅ ψη (14)
which allows higher biomass levels to reduce harvest costs.2 χ is the annual fixed
cost associated with all capital used in the fishery.
Models and Management Scenarios
Two stylized empirical models were created to capture differences of biological
stock characteristics including the rate of individual growth and average life span.
The first model represents a stock with moderate longevity. The second model de-
picts a long-lived species with low productivity. Each model was first used to
ascertain the effects of alternative discount rates and rebuilding timeframes. The
long-lived stock was then used to evaluate the effects of using supplemental output
controls including a minimum size limit, multi-year closures of the fishery, and
more restrictive harvest quotas. Such controls are routinely used to ensure the suc-
cess of rebuilding programs.
2 The assumed effect on the variable economic parameters ultimately depends on the value assigned to
the parameters. In this study, the parameters are positive and ensure the price and variable costs are in-
versely related to the TAC and SB, respectively (table 1).Larkin, Sylvia, Harte, and Quigley 400
Assumptions for the parameter values are summarized in table 1. The moderate
and long-lived stocks are assumed to have 20 and 70 cohorts, respectively, which
are modelled under 40- and 60-year timeframes.3 The relative differences in the
natural mortality, growth, weight, age at full maturity, and recruitment are character-
istic of K-strategists species with different life cycles (King and McFarlane 2003).
To better isolate the effects due to species longevity and discount rates, and to facili-
tate comparisons among scenarios, fish price and harvesting costs are assumed
identical between species.
Table 1
Variable and Parameter Definitions and Values
Stock Longevity
Description Symbol Moderate Long
Discount Rate δ 0%–24% 0%–24%
Time Horizon T 40 years 60 years
Number of Cohorts A 20 70
Initial Recruitment Nt=1,a=1 1 million 1 million
Natural Mortality Rate ω 0.20 0.05
von Bertalanffy Growth: La
Maximum length (cm) L∞ 90.0 40.0
Growth rate coefficient μ 0.24 0.07
Intercept if La=0 λ –1.10 –0.30
Weight (g) Wa
Direct coefficient γ 0.005 0.09
Power coefficient φ 2.90 2.70
Initial Spawning Biomass:
Numbers of fish SB_Nt=1 4.5 million 6.2 million
Weight of fish SB_Wt=1 5,239 mt 9,753 mt
Age at Full Maturitya am 12 5
Age at Recruitmenta a 11
Age at Full Selectivitya a 1 1, 25
Beverton-Holt recruitment: Rt
Productivity coefficient α 2.2 0.75
Stock size coefficient β 505.4 1,430.8
Price: P
Intercept coefficient θ $11,200 $11,200
Slope coefficient τ $9.20 $9.20
Variable Cost:b VC
Intercept coefficient ψ $7,200 N/A
Slope coefficient η $1.50 N/A
Fixed Cost χ $1,500,000 $1,500,000
a Age at full maturity is the youngest age included in the calculation of the spawning biomass. The
spawning biomass determines the number of recruits, which is the number of fish in the youngest cohort
that enter the model in each year. Age at selectivity is the youngest cohort that can be harvested; this age
is increased to am under the minimum size scenario (i.e., this is an added constraint to the optimization).
b The 70-cohort model could not be solved with the endogenous variable cost specification, so a constant
unit cost of $2,000/mt (the average from the endogenous specification in the baseline run) was assumed.
3 The modeling horizon for the long-lived cohort was restricted to less than one generation due to soft-
ware constraints. An optimal solution to the 60-year model could not, however, be found with the en-
dogenous cost specification, so these model runs only use ψ.Optimal Rebuilding under Alternative Plans 401
The starting point for each scenario is a depleted fishery that was determined by
“fishing down” the pristine stock under a 24% discount rate, which was the highest
observed in empirical studies published in Marine Resource Economics from 1985–
99 that were summarized in Harte et al. (2000). The resulting stock sizes were 7%
and 10% (362 mt and 962 mt) of the pristine stock sizes for the moderate- and long-
lived stocks, respectively. The effects of alternative rebuilding timeframes were then
examined under the assumption that the size of the spawning biomass will return to
the level that can produce MSY within a specified period of time and that the stock
size will remain above that level for the duration of the modelling horizon. The
spawning biomass level was used as the rebuilding target instead of the total biom-
ass level because the age at sexual maturity is an important factor in the
determination of whether a relatively long-lived stock has been rebuilt.
All equations are solved simultaneously using the MINOS solver in the General
Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) (Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus 1988) to
maximize NPV [equation (12)], which essentially solves for fishing mortality (F).
Rebuilding scenarios were optimized across different time horizons (T) with explicit
rebuilding requirements [the spawning biomass requirement on equation (5) dis-
cussed above] using discount rates ranging from 0 to 24%. This wide range was
selected for analysis to account for diverse preferences regarding the appropriate
level of discount rates between countries and to illustrate the effects of low relative
to high discount rates. For instance, New Zealand is required to manage fish stocks
for the “foreseeable needs of future generations,” which supports the use of a rela-
tively low discount rate (New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries 2002). That said, a
study of quota transfer prices that included New Zealand harvest rights revealed im-
plied discount rates of up to 50% (Asche 1999), and another study calculated rates
up to 20% (Akroyd et al. 1999). The subjective nature of the discount rate used in
New Zealand is in contrast to the prescribed rates for federally funded projects in
the US, which are specified by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The
real treasury rates published by the OMB ranged from 2.8% to 7.9% during the 1979
to 2005 period. To simplify the comparative analysis, we only present the results as-
sociated with the 4% and 24% rates, which reflect a range of observed and derived
discount rates under a variety of market and regulatory conditions.
Results and Discussion
Moderate Stock Rebuild
To examine alternative rebuilding scenarios for a moderate-lived stock, the depleted
20-cohort stock (i.e., 362 mt) is used to begin a new 40-year time horizon. Requir-
ing the stock to rebuild to the spawning biomass that would produce MSY (i.e.,
1,912 mt) within 10 years would generate a NPV of $5.6 million with a 24% dis-
count rate. Delaying the rebuilding requirement to 20 or 30 years with a 24%
discount rate would increase NPV by 17.7% to 19.4%, respectively. Table 2 summa-
rizes the changes in NPV and average TAC during the rebuild period from requiring
rebuilding within 10, 20, and 30 years at the two discount rates. Discounting at
higher rates has larger impacts, as rebuilding timeframes are delayed.
From an economic, social, and regulatory perspective an important issue is the
path the stock takes to reach the MSY target. Figure 1a shows the stock recovery
and the corresponding TAC requirements to rebuild in 10 years under a 4% discount
rate. The spawning biomass increases steadily to the required MSY stock size,
which indicates that this 20-cohort species is able to rebuild within 10 years. JustLarkin, Sylvia, Harte, and Quigley 402
before the 10-year rebuilding deadline approaches, annual TACs drop slightly to en-
sure the spawning biomass requirement is met. Following the 10-year rebuild,
annual TACs remain steady at approximately 400 mt and NPV totals $36.6 million.
Note that the harvest increases in the final year since there is no spawning biomass
level to maintain in the following year. If the rebuilding mandate is extended to 30
years, the effects of that action are shown in figure 1b. Although the stock is capable
of rebuilding in 10 years, a 30-year mandate allows recovery to occur gradually over
time. In response, the TACs increase over the first eight years and then stabilize
briefly before falling just prior to the 30-year deadline. Again, TACs stabilize at ap-
proximately 400 mt following the rebuild. Under the delayed rebuilding schedule,
NPV increases just 3.9% but likely minimizes the potentially negative impacts im-
posed on coastal communities from aggressive rebuilding schedules, which are not
captured in this analysis.
Figure 2a shows that under a 24% discount rate, the stock can also be rebuilt in
ten years but produces only $5.6 million in NPV (table 2). A comparison of figures
1a and 2a reveals that the higher discount rate produces significant reductions in
TAC in the years immediately preceding the deadline. This effect is even more se-
vere when the rebuilding deadline is delayed as shown in figure 2b. The annual TAC
stabilizes at approximately 300 mt in years 10 through 20, but falls to just 100 mt in
year 29, returning to the 400 mt harvest level in years 30 through 40. Again, the
stock rebuild is delayed as long as possible. This scenario increases NPV by 19.4%
compared to the 10-year rebuild plan depicted in figure 2a.
Table 2
Maximized NPV and Corresponding Average TAC during the Rebuild Period for the
Moderate-lived Stock under Alternative Rebuilding Timeframes and Discount Rates
Rebuilding Timeframea
Discount Rate (δ) 10 Years 20 Years 30 Years
NPV:
4% $36.6 millionb, d $37.9 million $38.0 millionc
(3.5 %) (3.9 %)
24% $5.6 millionb $6.6 million $6.7 millionc
(17.7 %) (19.4 %)
Average TAC during Rebuild:
4% 163.4 mtb 250.0 mt 321.9 mtc
(53 %) (97 %)
24% 141.8 mtb 207.0 mt 249.6 mtc
(46 %) (76 %)
a Parentheses contain the percentage change from the 10-year rebuild scenario. Scenarios require the
spawning biomass to reach 1,912 mt during the rebuilding timeframe and remain at or above that level
through the end of the modelling horizon (i.e., 40 years).
b The corresponding annual spawning biomass and TACs are shown in figure 1.
c The corresponding annual spawning biomass and TACs are shown in figure 2.
d Although not explicitly discussed, the consumer surplus changes across rebuilding plans are not trivial.
For example, for the 4% case, the consumer surplus losses from the 10-year recovery are in the range of
$3 million compared to 20 years and $6 million compared to 30 years.Optimal Rebuilding under Alternative Plans 403
Figure 1.  Annual Spawning Biomass and Optimal Harvest Levels for the 20-cohort
Stock with a 4% Discount Rate under 10- and 30-year Rebuilding TimeframesLarkin, Sylvia, Harte, and Quigley 404
Figure 2.  Annual Spawning Biomass and Optimal Harvest Levels for the 20-cohort
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In summary, annual harvest quotas fall rapidly in the years immediately preced-
ing a rebuilding deadline. This decline allows the spawning biomass to increase. At
higher discount rates the pre-deadline TAC reduction is more pronounced, as the
spawning biomass increase is delayed as long as possible. The decision to delay re-
building allows the harvests to remain higher in the early years when the discount
rate has a smaller effect. The NPV-effect of a delayed rebuilding schedule was, how-
ever, quite small at a low discount rate (despite a lower average harvest level).
These results are consistent with a priori expectations for non-linear fishery
models (with respect to the control variable) with no stock effects. The model main-
tains the stock at the long-run bioeconomic optimum as long as possible before it
rapidly increases the stock (and decreases harvests) to meet MSY constraints—
behaviour consistent with “turnpike” properties of constrained optimizations—see
Clarke (1985). At higher discount rates the adjustment paths are even steeper, since
high discount rates provide less incentive to smooth out nonlinear adjustment costs
over time.
Long-lived Stock Rebuild
To examine alternative rebuilding scenarios for a long-lived stock, the depleted 70-
cohort stock (i.e., 962 mt) is used to begin a new 60-year time horizon. Table 3
summarizes the optimal NPV and corresponding average TAC’s during rebuild from
requiring the stock to reach MSY (i.e., 2,953 mt) within 40, 50, and 60 years at dis-
count rates of 4% and 24%. In general, the long-lived stock is less productive during
rebuild and less valuable (in terms of NPV from the commercial sales) than the mod-
erate-lived stock.
Table 3
Maximized NPV and Corresponding Average TAC during the Rebuild Period for the
Long-lived Stock under Alternative Rebuilding Timeframes and Discount Rates
Rebuilding Timeframea
Discount Rate (δ) 40 years 50 years 60 years
NPV:
4% $6.5 millionb $10.3 million $14.7 millionc
(58 %) (126 %)
24% $0.93 millionb $3.3 million $5.9 millionc
(255 %) (534 %)
Average TAC during Rebuild:
4% 22.1 mtb 42.6 mt 72.7 mtc
(93 %) (229 %)
24% 15.9 mtb 26.2 mt 42.2 mtc
(65 %) (178 %)
a Parentheses contain the percentage change from the 40-year rebuild scenario. Scenarios require the
spawning biomass to reach 2,953 mt during the rebuilding timeframe and remain at or above that level
through the end of the modelling horizon (i.e., 60 years).
b The corresponding annual spawning biomass and TACs are shown in figure 3.
c The corresponding annual spawning biomass and TACs are shown in figure 4.Larkin, Sylvia, Harte, and Quigley 406
Figure 3 shows the stock recovery and the annual TAC requirements to rebuild
in 40 or 60 years under a 4% discount rate. With a 40-year rebuild mandate, the
spawning biomass declines before increasing at a decreasing rate to the required
minimum spawning biomass in year 40 (fig. 3a). Small harvests occur in years 1 and
2 and years 12 through 20; harvests begin to rapidly increase in year 30. The in-
crease in spawning biomass from year 17 to year 40 indicates that this 70-cohort
stock can be rebuilt in 23 years with a 4% discount rate. When the spawning biom-
ass reaches approximately 85% of the MSY-generating level, harvests are reinitiated
and increase steadily through the remainder of the modelling horizon.4
Figure 3b shows the effects of rebuilding within 60 years with a 4% discount
rate. Again, the figure shows that the stock can rebuild within 23 years. The longer
rebuilding mandate allows the stock to be further fished down (such that harvests
can remain as high as possible as long as possible in the early years when discount-
ing has less of an effect) before beginning to rebuild in year 17. At year 37 the
annual harvests would decline and eventually stop before beginning again in year
46. Under this delayed rebuilding schedule and relatively low discount rate, NPV
more than doubles to $14.7 million.
If the discount rate is increased to 24%, the general findings are unaffected as
shown in figure 4; however, some interesting effects emerge. Figure 4a shows that
the stock is capable of rebuilding in 23 years, as in figure 3b. As shown in table 3,
the NPV of this scenario is $0.93 million. A comparison of figures 3a and 4a reveals
that the higher discount rate results in higher TACs in the first three years when the
value of the harvests is discounted to a relatively greater degree.
For comparison, the effects of a 24% discount rate and 60-year rebuilding
timeframe are shown in figure 4b. With a relatively high discount rate and the long-
est rebuilding timeframe, NPV is maximized by harvesting as much as possible as
fast as possible. This harvest pressure causes the spawning biomass to first fall be-
fore beginning to rebuild in year 17. Under this scenario the fishery would be
effectively closed from year 10 to year 43. Again, the spawning biomass is fished
down from year 30 to year 43 before rebuilding a final time. With the higher dis-
count rate, harvests are larger and the spawning biomass is smaller in early years
(figure 3b versus 4b).
In the years preceding the rebuilding, the fishery for the long-lived species
would need to be closed for a period of seven to 32 years. This is in contrast with
the moderate-lived fishery that would not experience closures. In general, the long-
est closures occur under the highest discount rate, and the shortest closures occur
with the delayed rebuilding mandate. The decision to delay rebuilding allows the
harvests to remain higher in the early years when the discount rate has less of an
effect.
Under a 60-year rebuilding mandate, the higher discount rate results in an opti-
mal harvest plan in which harvests decline from approximately 375 mt in year 1
until an effective closure of the fishery in year 9. The fishery would then remain
closed until year 43 before stabilizing at harvest levels that average 43 mt for nearly
15 years. Under a 4% discount rate by comparison, the TAC would average 70 mt
and the fishery would not close until year 40. It would then remain closed for just
seven years.
In summary, unlike the 20-year cohort scenarios summarized in table 2, the
NPV-effect of a delayed rebuilding schedule for the 70-year cohort was significant.
4 Similar to the rebuilding analysis for the moderate-lived stock, the significant increase in TAC levels in
the final years is a modelling artefact reflecting surplus value at the end of the modelling horizon (i.e.,
there is no minimum SB requirement to maintain the following year).Optimal Rebuilding under Alternative Plans 407
Figure 3.  Annual Spawning Biomass and Optimal Harvest Levels for the 70-cohort
Stock with a 4% Discount Rate under 40- and 60-year Rebuilding TimeframesLarkin, Sylvia, Harte, and Quigley 408
Figure 4.  Annual Spawning Biomass and Optimal Harvest Levels for the 70-cohort
Stock with a 24% Discount Rate under 40- and 60-year Rebuilding TimeframesOptimal Rebuilding under Alternative Plans 409
At higher discount rates the spawning biomass remained as low as possible and for
as long as possible. This pattern is contrasted to the scenario involving a lower dis-
count rate in which rebuilding occurs gradually over time. Higher TACs in the face
of imminent reductions (in order to rebuild in the time allotted) may appear counter-
intuitive, but such harvest schedules are the direct result of discounting.
Long-lived Stock 40-year Rebuild with Additional Regulations
Three additional regulations designed to further ensure the stock is rebuilt are exam-
ined under the two discount rates with the 70-cohort stock and 40-year rebuilding
timeframe. The first scenario imposes a minimum size regulation by banning land-
ings of cohorts younger than age 25. The second scenario begins the rebuilding
timeframe with a 10-year closure. The third scenario places lower and upper bounds
on annual landings of 10 mt and 350 mt, respectively. Although this constraint is
less binding under a 4% discount rate than a 24% discount rate, this scenario illus-
trates the general effects of imposing some stability on the fishery (e.g., in response
to business and marketing costs associated with significant inter-annual variation).
The resulting NPV and average TAC levels from these scenarios are summarized in
table 4. As with the previous rebuilding analyses, the underlying MSY-based re-
building target is maintained such that the additional management regulations may
change the rebuilding pattern but do not affect whether the stock is rebuilt.
With a 4% discount rate the minimum size regulation decreased NPV by 37%
and the average TAC by 39% due to lower TACs. With a 24% discount rate, impos-
ing a minimum size policy would decrease NPV by only 1% and the average TAC by
just 3%. In contrast to the 4% discount rate scenario, the TACs would be higher in
Table 4
Maximized NPV and Corresponding Average TAC for a 40-year Rebuilding Timeframe of
the Long-lived Stock under Alternative Additional Regulations and Discount Rates
Additional Management Regulationsa
Discount Original Minimum Fishery Opens TAC Range:
Rate (δ) Scenarioa Size Year 11 10–350 mt
NPV:
4% $6.50 mil. $4.08 mil. $6.50 mil. $6.15 mil.
(–37 %) (0%) (–5 %)
24% $0.93 mil. $0.92 mil. $0.09 mil. $0.43 mil.
(–1 %) (–90 %) (–54 %)
Average TAC:
4% 82.3 49.9 mt 82.4 mt 80.5 mt
(–39 %) (0%) (–2 %)
24% 49.1 47.5 mt 54.3 mt 36.0 mt
(–3 %) (11 %) (–27 %)
a Parentheses contain the percentage change from the 40-year rebuild scenario. Scenarios require the
spawning biomass to reach 2,953 mt within 40 years and remain at or above that level through the end
of the modelling horizon (i.e., 60 years)Larkin, Sylvia, Harte, and Quigley 410
the initial years with a 24% discount rate. Regardless of the assumed level of the
discount rate, the lower TACs caused by regulatory discards did not increase average
harvest levels or social welfare.
For the initial 10-year closure scenario, there was essentially no change in either
NPV or the TAC pattern with a 4% discount rate. This occurs because the optimal
economic solution for the original scenario requires the closure of the fishery for the
first 12 years; thus, closures may be justified on a bioeconomic basis.5 For the initial
10-year harvest closure under a 24% discount rate, NPV would decline 90%, al-
though the average annual TAC would increase nearly 11%. The annual average TAC
was higher due to an early surge in landings around year 10 and accelerated harvest
rates in later years. NPV declines due to the higher discount rate and the fewer years
of high TACs around the year-10 peak.
For the TAC-bounded management scenario, NPV would fall 5% and the aver-
age TAC would decline just 2% under a 4% discount rate. Under the much higher
24% discount rate, however, NPV decreased 54% and the average TAC declined 27%
following the imposition of minimum and maximum annual TACs.
In summary, the imposition of additional fishing constraints designed to reduce
the risk associated with the failure to rebuild to the MSY-supporting level did not
increase NPV and had diverse effects on average landings. The diversity and magni-
tude of results highlights the importance of examining the implied rebuilding
schedules, which are likely to be unique to each combination of management op-
tions. The magnitude of the effects was also heavily dependent on the assumed
discount rate and underscores its importance in the determination of optimal re-
building schedules.
Conclusions
Implicit in the mandates of the New Zealand Fisheries Act and the US MSFCMA is
the concept of an optimal rebuilding rate or trajectory for depleted stocks. For New
Zealand fisheries, there is greater flexibility in designing a rebuilding process in or-
der to meet economic, social, and cultural needs. In the US the fisheries manager is
constrained by the requirement that stocks must be rebuilt within the “shortest pos-
sible time” and within 10 years if biologically possible (see footnote 1). The US
fisheries manager can sacrifice economic benefits in order to achieve a biologically
directed objective. Our analysis demonstrates that extending the rebuilding
timeframe (as allowed under the New Zealand Act) could increase the net present
value of commercial harvests from small to very significant levels depending on in-
put and output prices, technology, productivity of the stock, and the discount rate.
Corresponding harvest levels during a more flexible rebuilding plan could also more
readily contribute to goals, such as meeting the needs of fishing communities.
Bioeconomic models can assist the fishery manager in making transparent the
economic tradeoffs associated with alternative rebuilding timeframes, discount
rates, and supplemental regulatory policy instruments. In addition, objective func-
tions can be broadened to include other economic, social, or environmental
objectives that may be important in maximizing national benefits. Models can also
be used to evaluate distinct groupings or assemblages of species that “provide a
foundation for developing conceptual management scenarios based on generalized
5 Provided community impacts such as the employment rate, utilization of commercial fishing capital,
and the viability of ports are not adversely affected to a large degree. These effects were not captured in
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population dynamics,” as most recently classified by King and McFarlane (2003, p.
254) and recommended by NOAA Fisheries (2005). In this study, the moderate- and
long-lived species most closely resemble the “periodic strategist” and “equilibrium
strategist” species groups (e.g., rockfish and Pacific hagfish, respectively) identified
by King and McFarlane (2003).
With respect to rebuilding strategies for stocks of moderate longevity as mod-
elled in this paper, higher discount rates resulted in lower net present values, slower
rebuilding rates (spawning stock increases are delayed as long as possible), and
more pronounced harvest cutbacks as the rebuilding deadline approaches. However,
at rates that are lower and closer to prevailing market rates of interest, the effects
were less significant. Given the wide range of discount rates used for the moderate-
lived species represented by this analysis, a rebuilding period of 10 years, as
specified in the MSCFMA, would produce an economically inefficient outcome. In
addition, social inefficiency may be underestimated since impacts on fishing com-
munities are unaccounted for in this simplified analysis.6
Alternative rebuilding timeframes for the long-lived stock produced signifi-
cantly larger changes in the value of the fishery, even though the rebuilding
timeframe was shorter relative to the longevity of the species. In addition, the effect
of the discount rate was larger with the long-lived species. The effects on the aver-
age annual quotas of alternative rebuilding timeframes were also different at the
highest discount rate. Specifically, a delayed rebuilding timeframe for the long-
(moderate-) lived species would increase (decrease) the average annual harvest
quota during the first decade of rebuilding.
One major consideration not included in this analysis is the risk and uncertainty
associated with rebuilding fish stocks. Given the significant uncertainties that char-
acterize the dynamics of most fish stocks, there will be uncertainty in achieving
expected stock trajectories by managing fishing effort. In the US, guidelines allow
rebuilding schedules that may have as low as a 50% probability for achieving the
MSY biomass at the terminal date. This has the effect of slowing down the rate of
rebuild relative to higher probability levels. In other cases, it may be argued that
given stock uncertainties, the manager needs to take a “precautionary approach” and
decrease the rebuilding time by reducing fishing mortality. Placing the rebuilding
problem within a risk-based economic framework, however, also requires analyzing
the risks associated with achieving economic and social objectives, including the
long-term effects on fleets, processing firms, and coastal communities.
The model presented in this paper is intended to function primarily as a heuris-
tic device to explore economic issues associated with rebuilding moderate- and
long-lived stocks. The model provides a platform for managers and analysts to iden-
tify potential economic tradeoffs resulting from alternative rebuilding schedules,
including those based on biological criteria. The model can be expanded to explore a
wide range of biological, economic, and management issues associated with rebuild-
ing fish stocks.
In summary, the model demonstrates that dynamic bioeconomic analysis is a
relevant policy tool for gaining insights into designing optimal rebuilding strategies.
Because fish stocks are utilized to generate social welfare, and not simply biomass,
rebuilding analysis should employ social and economic criteria. Although lawmak-
ers may feel compelled to adopt relatively rigid rebuilding rules to meet
sustainability requirements—possibly in response to inaction by regional fishery au-
thorities—they must also recognize that such decisions may have real economic and
6 If an actual fishery were being modelled, additional scenarios would be needed to better capture the
community effects and the predicted changes in fish price and harvest costs.Larkin, Sylvia, Harte, and Quigley 412
social consequences. Exploring the potential of institutions and policies that create
incentives to rebuild fish stocks, while also moderating economic and social costs,
may be the model’s best and highest use. Regardless, however, designing rebuilding
plans that ignore the unique characteristics of each fishery—including social and
economic considerations—may result in significant loss of social welfare.
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